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How does a leader deal with a workforce
that is increasingly transient and for
which organizational loyalty is no longer
a hallmark of professionalism? How are
questions involving public relations,
legality, and political involvement and
interest handled? These problems are
not unique to the military. There is no
discussion of how leaders cope with periods of disruption, challenge, or failure.
Two other issues deserve mention. The
first is the book’s method of citation:
there are no footnotes or traditional endnotes. This aids the casual reader but not
the serious scholar, student, or executive
who needs to delve deeper. Perhaps the
publisher insisted on this methodology;
if so, one hopes it is for the last time.
The other issue is more challenging.
McChrystal goes to significant lengths
to present Team of Teams as a collaborative effort. This is commendable, and
there may be portions of the book that
represent a collective effort that is so
interwoven it defies any assignment of
individual credit. However, McChrystal
is the only author who truly can explain
the senior leader’s perspective and feelings. As such, his voice should dominate
the work, or at least be given clearly
identified and dedicated portions of the
book to provide solely his point of view.
Despite these shortcomings, Team
of Teams belongs on any bookshelf
devoted to modern works on leadership.
It asks important questions, has more
than a few sensible recommendations, and provokes useful follow-on
conversations. Its readability also will
be a plus for business school students,
who increasingly will be likely to find
it on their list of required texts.
RICHARD J. NORTON
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Gear Up, Mishaps Down: The Evolution of Naval
Aviation Safety, 1950–2000, by Robert Dunn.
Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2017. 224
pages. $29.95.

The average American’s view of
naval aviation likely is informed by
the movie Top Gun or, for those with
some historical knowledge, the carrier
battles of World War II in the Pacific.
Unknown even to most naval aviators
is a larger and equally dramatic story:
the Navy’s struggle to bring its aviation
accident rate under control. The number
of aircraft and aircrews lost to accidents
over the course of naval aviation’s history
is staggering—in the tens of thousands,
far more than ever were lost to combat.
A critical segment of that history
occurred during the period that retired
vice admiral Dunn reviews in his book.
After World War II, tectonic changes
occurred in naval aviation, including
the introduction of jet aircraft and
the advent of nuclear weapons. The
pressure on the Navy to demonstrate
the effectiveness of its aircraft carriers in
the rapidly evolving environment of the
1950s and ’60s was intense. The need to
fight in Korea with new and inadequately understood aircraft technology, as well
as to maintain a viable nuclear deterrent
posture day or night, in almost any
weather, produced horrendous accident
rates. In 1954 alone the Navy and Marine Corps lost 776 aircraft to accidents,
and 536 aircrewmen and passengers
were killed. There was legitimate doubt
that naval aviation would survive if that
rate of mishaps could not be reduced.
But survive it did, through reducing
accident rates—step by painful step. It
is a complex, multifaceted story that
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Dunn, a former commander of the
Naval Safety Center and Deputy Chief
of Naval Operations for Air Warfare,
is uniquely qualified to tell. This is
a book most easily understood and
appreciated by those who have been a
part of naval aviation. However, while
the book’s second half gets rather
technical, the author does provide both
explanatory endnotes and appendices
that offer background information to
help the lay reader make sense of it.
Dunn appears to be on a mission to
glorify those who made key contributions to the reduction in mishaps. This
is entirely justified, as the efforts of such
luminaries as James Flatley, Dr. Ashton
Graybiel, and Bob Osborne helped to
bring the accident rate down from the
hundreds of planes and crewmen lost
each year in the 1950s to the occasional
mishap that naval aviation experiences
now. Their efforts, and those of many
others, not only saved thousands of
lives and aircraft but ensured that
the nation would be able to maintain
command of the seas. The book is a
mixture of narrative and analysis that
forms a coherent explanation of how
naval aviation shifted from being a
freewheeling, daredevil operation to a
disciplined and professional enterprise.
The book is well organized and the
author’s writing is straightforward
and clear. However, the book contains
some small issues that casual readers
likely would miss but that can nag at an
experienced naval aviator (such as this
reviewer). One is the presence of contradictory statements about the potential
utility of the canceled supercarrier USS
United States; another is what appear to
be typos. The latter subtly change the
meaning of certain paragraphs, such
as the statement on page 22 that the
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helicopter community’s mishap experience was “atypical” for the day, when the
word should have been “typical,” or the
incorrect statement that the Frenchman
Paul Bert’s hypoxia experiments took
place in the twentieth century versus
the nineteenth. There are enough of
these “nits” in the first few chapters
to distract the knowledgeable reader,
although later chapters are cleaner.
The real issue is the book’s laudatory
tone. Dunn is forthright in describing
the various issues that led to the Navy’s
awful accident rates, and correctly identifies the measures that eventually fixed
the problem. Still, he fails to address
what is, in this reviewer’s opinion, a key
issue: the rate at which the Navy reduced
its accident rate in comparison with the
Air Force. In 1950, the Navy’s accident
rate was one and one-half times that
of the Air Force; by 1960 and through
1970, it was four times higher than that
of the Air Force, despite a concurrent
reduction in the overall accident rate
for both services. Even in 1980, the
Navy rate remained three times that
of the Air Force. However, by 1990
the relative accident rates for the Navy
and Air Force were equal—and have
remained so ever since. Any analysis of
naval aviation safety improvement in
the period the book covers should take
on this matter, and the failure to do so
is a key drawback of the book. Had the
Navy adopted the Air Force’s methods
in the 1950s, thousands of additional
lives and aircraft might have been saved.
Why the service did not do so is an
important part of the story, one that
should be told. Dunn does a good job of
describing the various threads that led to
the Navy’s victory over mishaps and the
book is worthwhile reading for anyone
who has ever been involved in naval

2

5/1/18 11:11 AM

160

NAVA L WA R C O L L E G E R E V I E W

Rubel and Dunn: Gear Up, Mishaps Down: The Evolution of Naval Aviation Safety, 19

aviation, but in the end it falls short of
delivering more-thorough reporting.
ROBERT C. RUBEL

Navy Football: Return to Glory, by T. C. Cameron.
Charleston, SC: History Press, 2017. 189 pages.
$21.99.

As both a U.S. Military Academy
(USMA) graduate and the father of
a USMA graduate, I jumped at the
chance to read a book about the
success of the U.S. Naval Academy
(USNA) football team. Let’s face it:
Navy has a winning program that has
dominated Army football in recent
years, even though both teams draw
from the same pool of talented high
school athletes. T. C. Cameron traces
the history of USNA’s football team,
including its comeback, or “return to
glory,” over the past fifteen years.
Bill Belichick, the legendary coach of
the New England Patriots, wrote the
foreword, in which he pays tribute to
the Navy coaches and midshipmen
who taught him the game of football.
“When I think of Navy football, my
early role models were some of the
biggest legends in the program’s history”
(p. 7). Belichick grew up in Annapolis
and his father, Steve Belichick, was an
assistant football coach at the Naval
Academy for thirty-four years.
Cameron first traces the history of Navy
football. He describes the period from
1950 to 1963 as its “Camelot” years.
The Navy football team was successful
under Coach Eddie Erdelatz and his
assistant coach Wayne Hardin, who
later succeeded him. During these years,
Navy also built the Navy–Marine
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Corps Memorial Stadium. The Navy
football team was winning consistently,
and legends such as Tom Lynch and
Heisman Trophy winners Joe Bellino
and Roger Staubach were winning
the hearts and minds of football fans
across the country. Even President John
F. Kennedy, himself a Navy veteran,
supported the Navy team. Kennedy’s
assassination in November 1963 was a
tremendous blow to the team, and many
wondered whether the Army-Navy
game would even be played the week
afterward. Ranked number two in the
country, Navy won the game, then went
on to lose to top-ranked Texas in the
Cotton Bowl. After the following season,
as Cameron puts it, “Camelot was over.
Without knowing it, a long cold winter
descended on the Navy program. It
would last almost forty years” (p. 26).
Cameron characterizes the years
between 1995 and 2001 as the “Big
Tease.” Under Coach Charlie Weatherbie, Navy football initially did well,
experiencing winning seasons. However,
as Cameron writes, “[h]is finish was a
disaster, as Navy lost seventeen of the
last eighteen” games he coached, “and
twenty of twenty-one overall” (p. 51).
Navy football’s true renewed success
began when Coach Paul Johnson, the
offensive coordinator in 1995–96,
returned, and Cameron portrays
2002–2007 under the heading “Johnson
Returns.” Johnson’s record at Navy was
43-27, with five bowl appearances in six
seasons. More importantly, Johnson’s
teams crushed both Army and Air
Force, losing only once against another
service academy. The football team
has continued to have winning seasons
under Coach Ken Niumatalolo from
2008 to the present, a period Cameron
characterizes as a “Ball of Fire” because
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